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Abstract
In this thesis, I present a novel example of intentional self-deception as embodied in selfhandicapping behavior. Self-handicapping is the proactive construction or acquisition of some
obstacle to success in some domain, and is employed by individuals primarily as a means of
deflecting blame for a failure or negative outcome. I argue that this behavior stands in a mutual,
symbiotic relationship to self-deception. On the one hand, self-handicapping is the behavioral
instantiation of the biased evidence manipulation which facilitates self-deception; while on the
other hand, self-handicapping effectively functions to bias judgments in this way only in case
concurrent self-deception sustains the behavioral process. If my account is accurate, the findings
support Intentionalist theories of self-deception, broadly, but also highlights behavioral selfhandicapping as a phenomenon worthy of philosophical attention.
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Epigraph
“To be sure, I knew my failings and regretted them. Yet I continued to forget them with a rather
meritorious obstinacy. The prosecution of others, on the contrary, went on constantly in my heart.
Of course—does that shock you? Maybe you think it’s not logical? But the question is not to
remain logical. The question is to slip through and, above all—yes, above all, the question is to
elude judgment. I’m not saying to avoid punishment, for punishment without judgment is
bearable. It has a name, besides, that guarantees our innocence: it is called misfortune.”
-Jean-Baptiste ClementCamus, The Fall

Section One – Introduction:
Self-Deception and the Neglect of Self-Handicapping
The contemporary philosophy of self-deception is primarily fueled by two disputes which
arise from the “lexical” (Mele, 1997) approach to conceptualizing the phenomenon. On the
lexical model, philosophers have looked to the meanings of the composite terms, “self” and
“deception,” investigating whether, and to what degree, self-deception is analogous to its
interpersonal (other-oriented) counterpart. This formulation is by and large congruent with our
natural language use and conventional understanding of “self-deception,” but even so is
nonetheless potentially subject to some conceptual opacity or incoherence.
Consider, if we pause to reflect on this conventional understanding of paradigm cases, we
find two “apparent truths” (Van Leeuwen, 2013) about deception which are not easily applied to
its reflexive counterpart:
(1) When deceiving another, I believe that p yet manipulate the target into falsely
believing not-p, and the process of deception is terminated when the target comes to
form that belief (not-p). Since in self-deception, though, I am both the perpetrator
and the victim, it seemingly follows that I must believe that p while convincing
myself, and coming to form the belief, that not-p.
(2) When deceiving another, as the perpetrator I intend to bring about the target’s false
belief; conventionally, deception is not typically taken to be an accidental occurrence.
Again, since in self-deception, I am both the perpetrator and the victim, it seemingly
follows that I must intend to bring about my own false belief.
Apparent truth (1) illustrates the “static” paradox, and (2) the “dynamic” paradox (Mele,
1997; 2001). We see that on the lexical model, it (paradoxically) follows from (1) that S (the
self-deceived) holds contradictory beliefs (that p and that not-p), and from (2) that S acts so as to
form a belief which they know to be false. Now, Mele (1997) abandons the lexical approach in
light of these paradoxes, instead framing the issue as “essentially about explanation” (p. 93).
That is, rather than conceptually constraining our understanding of self-deception in accordance
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with the semantic meaning of the terms, the explanatory approach looks to paradigm cases of
irrational belief formation and “postulate[s] self-deception in particular cases to explain
behavioral data…. And we should ask how self-deception is likely to be constituted…if it helps
explain the relevant data” (p. 93). But, there is nonetheless still mystery surrounding the
doxastic and motivational state(s) which accompanies self-deception, and on these grounds, the
static and dynamic puzzles are not dissolved merely by altering our approach. Basically, the
fundamental curiosities remain: what does S believe in self-deception, and how does S acquire
that belief?
Part of my aim in this work is to bring some clarity to this conceptual confusion, by way
of illustrating an empirically demonstrable type of action or pattern of behavior that is quite
similar to, and influential upon, self-deception, but one which has not received adequate attention
in the philosophical literature. Specifically, I argue that the common self-protective behavior
known as “self-handicapping” stands in a symbiotic, mutually reinforcing relation to selfdeception. I will focus on behavioral self-handicapping, S’s active construction or acquisition of
an impediment to their success in a given task, arguing that we engage in this behavior in order
to (deceptively) acquire or retain beliefs featured in our desired or ideal self-concept. In some
cases, S may merely claim or avow such an impediment (“I was sick, so I had to miss the
meeting”); but in the cases at hand, S actually constructs such an obstacle (say, by drinking to
induce a hangover, thus making themselves sick).
As I have in mind, the process unfolds roughly as such: S is placed into a situation in
which they expected to be evaluated along some dimension which is vital to their self-identity or
self-esteem; S feels as though they will be judged. In the face of this evaluation, the prospect of
failure brings with it a threat to S’s self-perceived identity, which, in turn, motivates S to protect
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that valued identity. So, in order to prevent the possibility of a neutral and objective evaluation,
S constructs or acquires an obstacle that may be used to explain away the negative outcome,
deflecting blame from S and onto that source. However, as we will see, this works both ways,
since in the case of success, S can claim victory in spite of the acquired obstacle, which suggests
an innate talent or virtue strong enough to overcome that disadvantage. Thus, in these cases,
self-handicapping serves to strengthen or enhance S’s desired self-identity.
For a quick example, imagine the student whose self-identity is importantly dependent on
a self-belief in their innate intellectual superiority to others. However, suppose that as final
exams approach, S becomes a bit anxious, since a poor grade would challenge these beliefs and
potentially threaten S’s identity. So, during finals week, S elects to party with friends or to play
video games on the nights before big exams, even though these behaviors are not most conducive
to success, indeed making failure more likely. But, S knows unconsciously that they may blame
any bad grade on this lack of preparation. Now, this behavior may indicate S’s lack of prudence,
for which they may deserve blame and which may reflect poorly on their character, but crucially,
it does not warrant any conclusions about S’s trait intelligence. Thus, the behavior functions to
shield valued features of S’s identity from the threat of a negative evaluation. Suppose though,
that S succeeds in the task, in this case getting an ‘A’ on the exam. Then, S may claim (and
believe) something like, “See, I didn’t even have to try to pass. I’m just that smart,” solidifying
S’s self-perception as innately intelligent. Actors in these cases create a kind of win-win for
themselves, since the external impediment might function to either externalize blame or to
internalize success, depending on the outcome.
From this rough description, perhaps the reader is familiar with the behavior, and
acquainted with a few folks apt to engage in it; self-handicapping is quite ubiquitous. Now, I
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take it that our conventional understanding of self-handicapping is one in which the behavior is
designed to save-face in the presence of an audience whom S desires to impress. The student
above may self-handicap so that others believe them to be superior, whether S comes to believe
this themselves or not. However, as we will see, these behaviors are not always (or even most
often) directed at an external audience. Instead, behavioral self-handicapping can function as a
method by which we manipulate ourselves into forming or retaining desired beliefs; a method by
which we self-deceive. Specifically, I argue that in self-deceptive self-handicapping, S
intentionally engages in self-handicapping behavior as a method of self-deception, in the active
sense of deceiving oneself. Although, I argue that self-handicapping cannot effectively function
as such unless S is unaware about their intentions in self-handicapping and the purpose for that
behavior.
In what follows, then, I provide a conceptual overview of the philosophy of selfdeception, generally, then more narrowly focusing on the dynamic problem. In the contemporary
literature, proposed answers to the dynamic paradox fall into two camps: deflationary
(Motivationalist) or Intentionalist (traditionalist) accounts. I will argue in support of
Intentionalism, relying on empirical demonstrations of self-handicapping behavior to show that
agents in the relevant cases are sufficiently motivated to self-deceive, and that these motivations
culminate in intentional self-handicapping behavior, which is guided by the goal of selfdeception and effectively serves that end. If my account is accurate, we find some support for
Intentionalism generally, but this work also hopes to highlight self-handicapping behavior as
worthy of attention in contemporary discussions of self-deception. As we will find, while largely
ignored by philosophers, this behavior is intimately connected to self-deception, as well as other
philosophically important concepts like intentionality and practical reasoning.
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Section Two: The Static and Dynamic Paradoxes of Self-Deception
Mele (1997; 2001) is responsible for a great deal of the progress in the philosophy of selfdeception. Mele’s deflationary view is influenced by his rejection of both of the assumptions
housed in the lexical model, arguing instead that standard deception requires neither any
concurrent beliefs between the deceiver and deceived, nor does it entail any intention to deceive
on part of the perpetrator. In rejecting the lexical model, Mele shifts the primary method of
investigation to one that is focused on the relationship between affective states, motivation, and
cognition, without necessarily attempting to salvage the analogy to standard deception.
One effective way to understand this framework is by an appeal to cognitive biases, and
especially to the distinction between “cold” vs. “hot” (motivated) biases (Kunda, 1990). When S
engages in cold-biasing, the acquisition of a false belief is in some sense innocent, as the biasing
is accidental – S has no immediate goal or desire which explains the biased cognition. “Hot,” or
motivated biases, on the other hand, are judgments which are slanted in light of some goal, or
because we have a stake in the truth-value of the relevant proposition. With respect to the
requisite motivation, S’s goal may sometimes be just that of forming an accurate judgment, in
which case we should not necessarily expect biasing. However, sometimes we engage in hot
biasing so as to reach a “particular, directional conclusion,” (Kunda, p. 480), often as a method
of self-protection and enhancement, or because the biased judgment facilitates some ulterior or
supervening goal. Stock examples of hot cognition include bias in recalling beliefs or memories
(p. 483) and the biased selection and evaluation of sources of evidence (p 489). Self-deception,
by these lights, is at least an instance of motivationally biased evidence manipulation, since selfdeception “is not simply a cognitive mistake; it is a motivated misrepresentation” (emphasis
original) (Funkhouser, 2019, p. 54).
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For instance, recall the previous example of the student who possesses an inflated sense
of native intellectual ability. If this individual fails a big test while the rest of the class does quite
well, the student may be motivated to attribute their own failure to a one-off poor performance,
avoiding unwelcomed evidence to the contrary, while perceiving the success of others to be
simply a fluke. Here, S is motivated to avoid admitting the possibility that their classmates
perhaps possess superior intelligence, and is therefore motivationally biased in seeking out,
evaluating, and rationalizing evidence, so as to avoid the unwelcomed belief and retain the
welcomed one. Thus, the acquisition of false beliefs consequent to hot biasing is not likewise
innocent and accidental as are cases of cold biasing, since it is not merely a mistake in reasoning,
but something self-serving which triggers the biased judgment.
The hot/cold cognition distinction significantly informs the contemporary philosophy of
self-deception as a widely agreed upon “minimal conception” of self-deception (Funkhouser, p.
54). Still, there are various ways in which motivational bias may manifest as deviant cognition
or behavior, and self-deception is supposed to be conceptually distinct from other potential
motivationally biased judgment. For instance, the self-important student may display thorough
irrationality in excusing her poor test scores, but we can nonetheless doubt whether from this
alone we should conclude that the student is properly in self-deception.1 It is logically possible
that all instances of self-deception may be accounted for by motivational bias, but not all
instances of motivational bias constitute self-deception. The latter is a more robust cognitive
deviance, and often suggests the presence of a more narrowly focused motivation. Whatever the

For instance, (Scott-Kakures, 2002) argues that wishful thinking can be distinguished
from self-deception in that the latter, but not the former, involves reflective reasoning and an
error in self-knowledge. Conversely, (Lynch, 2016) argues that willful ignorance is necessarily
intentional, while self-deception is “typically” not (p. 521).
1
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potential conceptual nuances, recent philosophy in self-deception has devoted itself to making
sense of the process and product of this biased judgment, and under this framework, we find
substantially less effort involved in resolving the lexical paradoxes, and a great deal more
emphasis on explaining stock examples of self-deception. While I do not adopt the lexical model
in this work, the language of the static/dynamic “puzzle” is nonetheless helpful, since, as
previously stated, the fundamental questions remain: what is the cognitive process involved in,
and what is the product of, self-deception?
The Static Puzzle: The Deflationary Position:
Mele (2001) offers the most prominent Motivationalist account, which aims to deflate the
puzzles, showing the paradoxes to be illusory, and explaining self-deception as a relatively
uncomplicated instance of motivated irrationality. Mele rejects the lexical constraints on dual
belief and intent, and in all, the following four conditions are jointly sufficient for an instance of
self-deception (pp. 50-51):
“1. The belief that p which S acquires is false.
2. S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value of p in a
motivationally biased way.
3. This biased treatment is a nondeviant cause of S’s acquiring the belief that p.
4. The body of data possessed by S at the time provides greater warrant for ∼p
than for p.”
As it concerns the doxastic paradox, (1) is the only directly relevant condition. The other
conditions bear on S’s methods of evidence manipulation (2), how those methods shape S’s
judgment (3), and the external evidence available to S (4). Mele argues that none of these
conditions are individually necessary, and argues positively that (4) is plainly not necessary. But
it nonetheless follows from this account that condition (1) is necessary for instances in which the
person is self-deceived in believing that p, since “a person is, by definition, deceived in believing
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that p only if p is false” (emphasis original). However, this is a “purely lexical point…and in no
way implies that the falsity of p has special importance in the dynamics of self-deception,” on
Mele’s account (2001, p. 51).
Since, according to Mele, the doxastic end-state of self-deception is simply false belief,
we should pause to take note that his account does not argue that in self-deception S replaces,
represses, or sublimates an existing belief (Funkhouser, 2019, p. 88). It is here that Mele departs
from the lexical model in his rejection of the dual-belief condition, that S both believes p and ~p.
The deflationary position hopes to sidestep the static puzzle by arguing it is sufficient for an
instance of self-deception that S acquire a false belief2, in turn eliminating any conceptually
necessary doxastic conflict or contradiction between S’s belief that p and other antecedent or
concurrent beliefs. Therefore, it follows from Mele’s account that self-deceptive belief is not
inherently paradoxical, since S’s belief that p need not conflict with other doxastic states.
However, one may question both the necessity and sufficiency of false belief as the (sole)
doxastic attitude properly belonging to self-deception. For instance, a common line of objections
argue that Mele’s account neglects the anxiety or tension which accompanies the self-deceptive
venture and/or the final doxastic product (Audi, 1982; Bach, 1997; Barnes, 1997; Funkhouser,
2005). Audi, for example, argues that in self-deception, S unconsciously knows the truth (not-p)
but “sincerely avows, or is disposed to sincerely avow,” belief in its negation, that p (1982, p.
135). Self-deception, on this reading, does not terminate in the acquisition of a false belief, since
S unconsciously retains a hold on the truth, while merely claiming the deceptive belief. Selfdeception, then, is essentially characterized by this tension or dissonance (p. 137). Somewhat

Of course, S must acquire this belief in the proper, self-deceptive way, but this is a
matter about the dynamics of deception, however, and not wholly relevant to the static puzzle.
2
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similarly, Barnes argues that self-deception is motivated by an “anxious desire,”3 and that the
process “always involves some reduction of anxiety,” (1997, p. 35).4 And, lastly, Bach and
Funkhouser, respectively, argue that S holds the truth “dangerously close to hand” in selfdeception (Bach, p. 105), which renders the process one of ongoing epistemic manipulation.
Then, throughout this deceptive process, S’s strategic avoidance of and attention to evidence is
good reason to believe some such tension is present (Funkhouser, pp. 300-301).
Mele has no qualms in admitting that some instances of self-deception may
(contingently) involve anxiety (reduction), but describes this state as an affective or emotive
anxiety, not the cognitive anxiety we associate with racing thoughts (Mele, 2001, p. 55), and in
any event is not a necessary condition on his model. Whether self-deceptions entails anxiety is
an empirical question, but for present purposes in reviewing the literature, however, we need
only note that the Motivationalist position is not committed to the existence of dual,
contradictory beliefs in self-deception. In all, the deflationary position hopes to avoid paradox
by simplifying our understanding of the nature of the mental state(s) involved in self-deception.
Certainly, the simplicity of the deflationary position is a virtue, since it allows for an explanation
of self-deception which relies only on a singular false belief, dissolving the potential paradox;
but what these accounts afford in coherence, they may sacrifice in explanatory force.
For, if the false belief that p is sufficient to account for the doxastic state produced by
self-deception, then accounts following suit may struggle to distinguish the belief-state involved
in self-deception as compared to that involved in other instances of motivated bias. However, as

There is no need to detail which features of a desire are sufficient to render it an
“anxious” one, since it seems clear that most desires do not have this property. My basic
hedonistic desire to eat a cookie, for instance, is not motivated by anxiety.
4
For a more thorough review of Barnes’s position, see Seeing Through Self-Deception
(1997, Ch. 2& 3).
3
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we saw, while some have argued that self-deception is distinct on grounds of an accompanying
state pf anxiety, I am unwilling to claim that this condition is necessary. To posit the necessity of
anxiety in self-deception, one must then deny the phenomenon in all instances of motivated
irrationality in which S is “free from psychic conflict,” (Mele, 2001, p. 53). This is too stringent
a condition; surely there are some instances of conflict-free self-deception. Furthermore, even in
case such anxiety is necessarily present in instances of self-deception, this attitude is neither the
sole feature which distinguishes self-deception, nor that feature which best illustrates and
explains it.
So, the outcome of this dispute is not sufficient to determine our broader understanding
of self-deception. Simultaneously, though, it seems prima facie apparent to me that a significant
number of (if not most) instances of paradigm self-deception, do involve anxiety reduction
mentioned by Barnes, or the sensitivity to the truth as suggested by Audi and Bach. So, I will not
take a firm stance with respect to the precise role of doubt, anxiety, or tension in deceptive belief.
I do not think such a condition is a necessary feature of self-deception, though accounts which
outright neglect the common experience of doxastic tension will tend to fall short in providing a
robust explanation of the phenomenon. In accordance with Mele’s view, then, from this point
forward this paper accepts the sufficiency of false belief in accounting for the self-deceptive
state, but I suspect such instances constitute the exception, rather than the rule.
Psychological Partitioning
Partitioning, or divided mind, accounts meet the dual belief condition head on, though
not attempting to deflate the paradox, but instead deny the paradox ostensibly inherent to the
dual belief condition. Psychological partitioning theories (Pears, 1984; Rorty, 1994; Davidson,
2004) appeal to unconscious mental states and cognitions in order to account for dual beliefs,
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positing a mind in which contradictory beliefs, values, and desires reside with quasi-independent
subpersonal operators. So, the fundamental claim shared by these accounts of self-deception is
that the dual-belief condition is not a paradox, since one need not argue that the entity doing the
deceiving is identical to that which ends up deceived.
Unfortunately, I doubt that these descriptions of the self will prove any less abstract as we
progress, but I think we can make sense of these claims, even if we find ourselves unconvinced.
Beginning with Rorty (1994), this account offers a quite Freudian description of self, arguing
that this self (or ego) is composed of various subconscious, subpersonal entities, and moreover,
that these entities may possess unique motivations and beliefs. On this reading, individual
persons are some amalgamation of, and the interaction between, “sub-systems……whose
interaction is only precariously integrated” (pp. 223-224). Most of all, however, the entities are
capable of engaging in “nonpurposive but intentional operations” (p. 224) toward the deceptive
end. Accordingly, this account hopes to avoid paradox by arguing that the system or agent doing
the deceiving is not identical to that which is deceived, even though both factor into a singular
identity. What is most striking about this account is the agential nature of the subpersonal units,
and their ability to deceive, and their liability to fall into deception; but whether such agency is
present is not particularly prescient to the problem at hand. As a matter purely of S’s doxastic
attitude, on this reading, the upshot is that some subconscious, subpersonal unit actively
suppresses or conceals some information from the feature with which S identifies in the context.
Unlike Mele, Rorty argues that self-deception need not produce a false belief, instead arguing
that the process may result in S’s acquiring a true belief, or maybe no belief at all (p. 216).
Similarly, Pears (1984) describes self-deception as a kind of psychological “schism” (p.
74). Again appealing to sub-personal entities, this account argues that composite features of the
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self contend with one another for identification with the “main system” – S’s coherent,
composite self (p. 101). When sufficiently motivated, Pears claims, the subsystems drive the
main system to selectively attend to preferred evidence and suppress unwelcomed evidence, thus
acting as agents in manipulating S’s (the main system) beliefs. Rorty likened these subsystems
to the “President’s Cabinet” (p. 217), since each agent works both independently and in concert
with the others to maintain and manipulate the functioning of the primary agent, and I think this
analogy is apt for Pear’s account, as well. Both explanations of self-deception describe selfdeception as something of a resolution to an internal conflict between competing agents, vying
for identification.
Admittedly, this language is psychologically rich, but upon reflection, I suspect that we
are familiar with the description of an individual experiencing conflict between their “identity as
a parent” and “identity as an employee,” for example. In this sense, the self is more readily
understood as totality of our values, beliefs, affiliations, and experiences. It also seems clear that
we do differentially identify with these various features, and that these motivate us in often
conflicting directions. Though, while this much seems uncontroversial, to assume that these
constituent features of the self may also possess individual beliefs as is the case with
motivations, is simply to beg the question. So, ultimately whether the concept of self as is
properly described as the composition and interplay between competing sub-agents, and
moreover, whether such a notion could withstand empirical scrutiny, are issues which cannot be
sufficiently addressed here. What Rorty and Pears highlight in their work, though, is the
experience of our being conflicted in motivation and belief, and the (at least) superficial
appearance of some agency in the self-deceptive project. Now, the question of agency demands
its own discussion, but these accounts address the static puzzle by appeal to various entities
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which may possess the conflicted beliefs, in turn arguing that these entities are divided mind
accounts are vital in advancing the Intentionalist position.
So, while Rorty and Pears are on to something in arguing for the explanatory importance
of the seemingly purposive5 behavior in self-deception, it is nonetheless fair to question the
degree to which this apparent agency is explained by the subpersonal agents described. These
theories ask more of us than for a mere admission of unconscious belief or motivation into the
account of self-deception, indeed going further in requiring that our ontology includes some
quasi-autonomous entities which compose a coherent self. One immediately wonders whether
such a postulation is empirically verifiable, if not plainly superfluous on conceptual grounds.6
With this in mind then, looking to Davidson (2004) as an example of a (unreservedly
Intentionalist) partitioning theory in which the mental sequestration of conflicting states does
more work in explaining the sustained state of self-deception, as compared with Pears’ work
which is most basically interested in the deceptive process. Specifically, Davidson is
fundamentally concerned with irrational doxastic states associated with self-deception, and the
accounts breaks from Rorty’s and Pears’ in claiming that self-deception should not be imagined
as “two minds each somehow able to act like an independent agent; [but] rather that of a single
mind not wholly integrated; a brain suffering a perhaps temporary lobotomy” (p. 221). Davidson
argues that the partition he posits is simply the “metaphorical wall” functioning to suppress at
least one of the conflicting beliefs in order to prevent both beliefs from being “destroyed” (p.
220). This metaphor is not intended to constitute a full-fledged psychological explanation of
self-deception, but to stand in for whatever the psychological mechanisms are which facilitate

I reserve any language of “intention” in this section. As mentioned, the issue of
intention will receive a focused discussion in what follows.
6
As a deflationary position might argue, for instance in (Mele, 2001, Ch. 2&3).
5
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belief suppression as such. That is all a basic partitioning account requires – that there exists
some psychological mechanism by which our motivations and beliefs are sometimes insulated
from other mental states, or by which these beliefs are otherwise rendered inaccessible. As stated
previously, my work here is not meant to offer any robust analysis of the doxastic states
consequent to self-deception, but a grasp on the divided mind accounts is nonetheless
prerequisite to an understanding of the Intentionalist theories upon which my analysis of selfdeceptive self-handicapping ultimately relies. So, the works just outlined inform my arguments
to follow in a few ways.
First, I accept Mele’s claim that S’s false belief that p is sufficient to account for the
doxastic state associated with self-deception. Though, I am nonetheless confident that many
instances of self-deception induce a doxastic state not entirely consumed by the folk concept of
belief, or perhaps even a state not accurately described as a belief at all. So, a thorough account
will likely find that paradigmatic instances of self-deception involve some mental state in
addition to, or as distinct from, a false belief. Moreover, as I hope to show, Rorty’s and Pears’
works prove valuable in accounting for the empirical data related to self-handicapping behavior,
since in these cases, the motivation to engage in self-deceptive self-handicapping is sourced from
relatively specific features of S’s self-perceived identity. Self-deceptive self-handicapping is
narrowly focused in a manner perhaps unlike the deceptive processes involved in some garden
variety cases; as motivated by, and serving to protect, specific features of the self, the language
of subpersonal agents with (quasi-)independent goals, desires, and beliefs is all the more
prescient. However, if it turns out that the language employed by Rorty and Pears is inaccurate,
such a finding does not significantly undermine my account, as ultimately, we can make do with
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Davidson’s metaphor representing beliefs and desires as psychologically walled off from one
another.
Before proceeding with this foundation, though, diligence requires that I mention here an
alternative class of “revisionary” accounts (Funkhouser, 2009; Baghramian, 2013) which argue
that folk psychological concepts like desire and belief cannot provide an adequate answer to the
doxastic puzzle.7 Now, certainly the validity of our lay understandings of mental phenomena are
often strained by the apparently paradoxical, and at least demonstrably irrational, cognitions and
behaviors appurtenant to self-deception. But, my account need not adopt any specific theory of
mind in order to proceed. Instead, we may adopt a rather broad understanding of belief as
simply “the psychological attitude in which a person regards a proposition as true…. [T]o
believe a proposition is to regard it as true all things (i.e., psychologically relevant factors)
considered.” (Funkhouser, 2009, p. 5). In adopting this broader view of belief, my account is
therefore potentially acquiescent to various theories of mind or descriptions of doxastic attitudes.
Having outlined the responses to the static puzzle, and having positioned this account somewhere
within the family of partitioning accounts, we can now turn to the dynamic puzzle – that related
to S’s agency and intention in carrying out the self-deceptive task.
The Dynamic Paradox: Is SD Intentional?
Mele (2001) succinctly expresses the dynamic paradox, and the responsibilities of
philosophers who attempt to resolve it, as follows:

“[T]here are other cases in which the self-deceived produce a confused belief-like
condition, so that it is genuinely indeterminate what they believe with respect to p. Yet, such
people, the deeply conflicted, can be wholly self-deceived nonetheless. If this is true, then selfdeception does not produce a common product…. The protracted debates over the motives and
products of self-deception are largely due to disputants using folk-psychological tools that
simply are not up to the task” (Funkhouser, 2009, p. 13).
7
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If I am trying to bring it about that I believe that I am a good driver…perhaps by
ignoring or downplaying evidence that I am an inferior driver while searching for
evidence of my having superior driving skills—won’t I see that the “grounds” for
belief that I arrive at in this way are illegitimate? And won’t I therefore find myself
still lacking the belief that I am a good driver? A predictable reply is that
the…efforts…are not conscious efforts and therefore need not stand in the way of
their own success in the way just envisioned. Whether, and to what extent, we
should postulate unconscious tryings…depends on what the alternatives are. (pp.
13-14)
Paradigmatic instances of self-deception are motivated by the desire for p to be true of the world
(Mele, 1997; 2001), or alternatively, to simply believe that p is true regardless of the material
reality (Nelkin, 2002; Funkhouser, 2005).8 Typically, in explaining the goal-oriented actions of
others, we rely on a standard belief-desire model, positing the existence of an intention to link
the individual’s mental states with the consequent behavior designed to satiate the desire or
achieve the goal. However, in the case of self-deception, the supposition of an intention to link
the desires with actions may render such an explanation incoherent. For, if my intention is to
deceive myself, then won’t I recognize that my belief that p is formed on epistemically shaky
grounds, thus preventing me from actually acquiring that belief? It seems, at least initially, that
one’s intention to self-deceive would render the entire goal-pursuit futile.
Answers to this challenge are, broadly, classified as either Intentionalist (agency) views,
or deflationary (anti-agency) views. Intentionalist accounts claim that in paradigmatic instances
of self-deception, S’s desire that p (or to believe that p) produces an intention to deceive oneself
into believing that p. On the other hand, standard deflationary accounts do not a priori reject the
possibility of intentional self-deception, but rather argue that such examples are fringe
instances,if at all demonstrated in the literature. So, in all, the disagreement is rooted in

8

“World-directed motive” vs. “Mind-directed motive” (Funkhouser, 2019, p. 66)
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explanatory superiority, where each camp claims to explain the most common instances of selfdeception.
The Deflationary Position: Eliminating Intention
The deflationary position generally denies that intention plays a significant role in
standard cases of self-deception, arguing that affective states or other motivations are causally
responsible for S’s coming to believe that p without an accompanying intent to deceive. As we
have seen, Mele (1997; 2001) argues that the following four conditions are jointly sufficient to
constitute an instance of self-deception (pp. 50-51):
1. The belief that p which S acquires is false.
2. S treats data relevant…to the truth value of p in a motivationally biased way.
3. This biased treatment is a nondeviant cause of S’s acquiring the belief that p.
4. The body of data possessed by S at the time provides greater warrant for ∼p than
for p.
(2) and (3) are uniquely related to the dynamic puzzle, since these call for an explanation of how
motivation can bias one’s cognition, what that biased treatment of evidence looks like, and what
it means for that treatment to be a “nondeviant” cause of S’s belief that p with an appeal to the
intention to self-deceive.
According to Mele’s model, S desires that p is true of the world, and this desire
influences the selection and evaluation of hypotheses pertinent to forming a judgment about
whether p. Specifically, Mele argues that S’s hypothesis testing, and the resultant acquisition of
a belief, is mediated by the costs associated with falsely believing that p. Mele argues that the
acquisition of a false belief entails some costs—in terms of affect, social value, or “whatever one
might expect” from forming a belief (Mele, 2001, p. 35). When the false belief that p is costly,
S ought to be influenced to test disconfirming hypotheses, and interpret the data in a light
conducive to the rejection of p. Alternatively, high costs associated with the false rejection of p
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should motivate the search for confirmatory evidence. In the case of self-deception, when S’s
acceptance of the false belief that p is less costly than the false rejection of the truth, that not-p,
Mele’s model predicts self-deception. That is, in all cases of self-deception, S’s false acceptance
of the proposition entails the concomitant rejection of the true proposition that not-p, and when
the false acceptance is less costly (or roughly equally costly) than the accompanying false
rejection of the truth, S should be inclined to self-deceive (given the requisite desire).
Now, all this is quite abstract, so we can look to the following example to help make
some sense (Mele, 2001, pp. 37-38).
Bob wants it to be true that he is the best third baseman in his league. Owing partly
to that desire, he has a lower threshold for believing that he is than for believing
that he is not. Bob examines the statistics on the competition and decides, correctly,
that his main competitor is Carl. Bob and Carl have the same fielding percentage,
but Carl has a few more home runs…several more runs batted in…and a higher
batting average. However, Carl’s team is much better than Bob’s, and, as Bob
knows, players on better teams tend to have more opportunities to bat in runs…and
to hit home runs…Bob takes all this and more into account and comes to believe
that he is a better player than Carl.
As it turns out, however…Carl is the better player…. Carl’s team was far superior
to Bob’s, but…Carl batted many fewer times than Bob…And …given this statistic,
Carl still outperformed Bob in home runs and runs batted in.
…Bob’s coming to the conclusion he does is explained in significant part by his
having a lower threshold for believing that he is better than Carl than for believing
that this is not so…. Given the difference in thresholds, Bob’s acquiring the belief
that he is the better player requires less evidential support than does his acquiring
the belief that this is not the case.… And there is no evident need to suppose that
Bob tried to bring it about that he believed, or tried to make it easier for himself to
believe, that he is the better player, or tried to reduce the probability that he would
believe that Carl is the better player.
In all, the costs for Bob of falsely rejecting the true belief that Bob is the superior player do not
outweigh the costs associated with his falsely believing himself to be the superior player. For
Bob, the costs of rejecting the truth about his relative talents (dissatisfaction of his desire) may
be higher than the costs of false acceptance of the false belief (whatever costs are associated with
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Bob’s being deceived), and in such a case, Mele predicts self-deception. Fundamentally,
according to Mele, self-deception is explained on the basis of our tendency to avoid costly errors
in belief.
We must take note that the deflationary position does not deny the “unproblematic
possibility” of “intentionally deceiving oneself,” as embodied in an intentional action which is
causally responsible for S’s belief that p (Mele 1997, p. 99). But notice here that the intention in
action does not adequately explain why it is that S came to believe that p. For example, I may
intentionally walk across the room, consequently stepping on my dog’s toy and experiencing
some pain as a result. While my walking was intentional, I did not likewise intend to step on the
toy nor bring about my experience of pain, so the outcome of my actions is not explained as a
function of my intention but as an accidental byproduct.9 So, the deflationary position argues
that S’s intentions do not explain, in this way, the acquisition of the self-deceptive belief – that
we can “only—or best—explain” self-deception by appeal to intention (1997, p. 99). So, the
primary burden of Intentionalist accounts is illustrating explanatory superiority.
One feature of self-deception that motivates the Intentionalist position is the potential
insufficiency of desire to account for the “selective” nature of self-deception (Bermudez, 1997,
2001). That is, one may desire various things in various contexts, but typically, these desires
alone are insufficient to render an acquisition of the false belief. For instance, I may desire it to
be the case that I have possess the talent to play in the NBA (or the desire to believe as much),
but I do not in turn deceive myself about the truth of the matter. Moreover, this seems to be the
typical case; I have many desires, the majority of which, however, do not produce self-deceptive
belief. It is not entirely clear how desire is functioning according to the deflationary account,
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Audi (1982) argues that self-deception is explained as this kind of action and outcome.
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since we most often posit the existence of some intention to bridge gap between motivation and
action.
Now, Mele appeals to “internal biasing” (2001, p. 60), as the biased interpretation of
available evidence, as one mechanism responsible for self-deceptive belief acquisition, and such
rationalization surely does corrupt our beliefs. Further, I do not claim that these kind of internal
rationalizations are intentional in the relevant sense. However, in self-deception, S is not merely
a passive recipient of evidence, which is in turn rationalized, but rather seeks or avoids certain
evidence, so as to acquire the desired belief; Bob attended to certain statistics and avoided
unfavorable ones. While the deflationary position may account for S’s deceptive internal biasing
once they are in the presence of evidence, in self-deception S is not merely the passive recipient
of evidence, instead selectively engaging with sources which contribute to the deceptive venture.
Mele (p. 60-61) notes that self-deception may rely on strategic “input-control”—the somewhat
tactical selection and avoidance of (dis-)favorable evidence—but, the Intentionalist charge is that
desire or motivation, alone, is insufficient to explain this behavior. While I will grant Mele’s
claims regarding internal biasing, it seems that desire is performing a unique function in selfdeceptive input control, which we rarely if ever witness in other behaviors.
Intentionalism resolves this potential pitfall, purporting to explain S’s behavior by way of
an intention to bring about the belief that p, linking the motivation to believe with active
evidence manipulation. However, these accounts face a similar worry, since just as desire is
perhaps insufficient to explain self-deception, desire alone is insufficient to explain the formation
of an intention to self-deceive. Thus, an adequate theory of Intentionalism will also answer its
end of the “selectivity problem,” explaining the manifestation, presence, and function of the
requisite intention (Jurjako, 2013; Funkhouser, 2019, pp. 112-114).
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Generally speaking, very little of the Motivationalist position depends on a sophisticated
understanding of ‘intention’. Mele, however, has quite a bit to say about intention elsewhere
(1994; Adams & Mele, 1989), and, in his work on self-deception, refers to intention as an
“executive attitude” that involves “making [one’s] mind up” about acting on some motivation
(1997, p. 98). So, as one last detour before submitting some positive claims, a more thorough
dissection of Mele’s thoughts on intention are helpful for making clear his position on selfdeception, but also for helping to highlight the mental states and behaviors we ought to look for
in ascribing intention in self-deception.
According to Mele & Moser (1994), intentions include both motivational and cognitive
aspects. The motivational component, qua desire, contributes to the goal-formation and the
initiation of action (p. 26). On the cognitive side, intentions function to provide a “plan” for S to
bring about the satiation of their desire and to structure S’s actions accordingly. This much
accords with the standard belief-desire model of intention, but Mele concludes that S has an
intention only if S is “settled” on carrying out a plan of action in order to achieve a goal or bring
about a desired state. The action initiation and goal-pursuit sparked by an intention results in a
complex process of behavior, such that intention functions in multiple ways, to “initiate” and
“motivationally sustain” action; to “guide and monitor” action; to “coordinate activities”; and to
“prompt and terminate practical reasoning” (p. 27). The Motivationalist position argues that this
mental state, intent, is absent in the standard case of self-deception.
The crux of determining whether an action is intentional, then, relies on the degree to
which S’s mental state is like that described in (Mele & Moser 1994), and whether this state
sufficiently “guides and sustains” their action. This, in turn, depends on whether S is responsive
to goal-directed feedback, adjusting their behavior in response to its effectiveness in attain the
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goal. Therefore, in advancing my claims, I will argue that in cases of self-deceptive selfhandicapping, S is settled on self-deceiving10, and moreover, that this disposition structures and
guides S’s self-handicapping behavior. In these cases, I argue that S responds to resources which
assist in self-handicapping, adjusting their behaviors in accordance with these and other
situational constraints, ultimately in a manner which facilitates acquisition of the self-deceptive
belief. I will go on to argue that S intentionally engages in self-handicapping just because that
behavior is conducive to self-deception, and further, that S is unconsciously aware of their
motivations and the function of self-handicapping, strategically employing the behavior in light
of the motivation to believe that p. First, however, we must pin down what we are talking about
in referring to “self-handicapping”.
Section Three: Self-Handicapping Behavior – Conceptualizing the Phenomenon
Self-handicapping is a specific type of excuse-making, and when the behavior becomes
self-deceptive, we may describe the people in these cases as making an excuse for themselves.
Generally, we offer excuses in hopes of deflecting some blame away from ourselves, focusing
that attention on factors beyond our control, and I take it that most are fairly well acquainted with
this understanding. Stated more formally, excuses function to “shift the causal attributions” for
negative outcomes from “sources relatively central to one’s sense of self to sources relatively less
central…” (Snyder & Higgins, 1988). When we offer the standard excuse, we express that a
given outcome is not our fault.
The motivation to offer excuses is triggered by evaluative situations, and specifically
those in which S perceives the situation as one in which there is a risk of having their identity,
personality, or intrinsic traits linked to – perceived as causally responsible for – some negative
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My account is therefore mind-directed.
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outcome. When an individual expects to be evaluated by others in light of some course of action,
the potential for the outcomes of these actions to be attributed to the individual’s trait
characteristics or intrinsic qualities becomes all the more salient. The stronger an individual’s
expectation, the more subjectively salient this possibility. If S expects the outcome of their
actions to be positively evaluated, they may welcome such an attribution; but when the agent
expects a negative outcome, we find that S is motivated to dissolve perceptions that something
internal to them is responsible for the outcome.
Synder and Higgins (1988) distinguish between verbal (claimed) and non-verbal
(behavioral) excuses (p. 243-244). Our standard understanding of what it means for one to make
an excuse most often implicates the verbal type. These verbal excuses are ubiquitous: “I am
sick”; “I overslept”; “I just forgot”; “I got distracted”. In these cases, we see that the claims
indeed function to shift attributions of responsibility; even though S may be blamed for
oversleeping or forgetting, these (claimed) mistakes do not typically reveal anything native to the
excuse-maker, but are instead instances of an ostensibly contingent, temporary deviance.
Behavioral excuses express basically the same message, and have basically the same
function, as their verbal counterpart. But these instances uniquely involve some “physically
observable manifestations” beyond, or in place of, the mere avowal (p. 243). For example, the
authors ask us to imagine the starting pitcher of a baseball game who is having a poor
performance. As the manager comes to remove the pitcher from the game (much earlier than
anticipated), the pitcher begins to rub their throwing arm and wince in pain, leaving the audience
and teammates to witness the pitcher’s ostensible disadvantage. The effect, if successful, is not
necessarily different than it would have been had the pitcher simply claimed the existence of arm
pain, so the basic function is retained.
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Snyder and Higgins further distinguish between types of excuses on the grounds of
whether the excuse is retrospective (past-oriented) or anticipatory (future-oriented) (pp. 244245). Retrospective excuses are likely most familiar, and these excuses function to explain away
an outcome which has already occurred. These “after-the-fact” excuses hope to weaken causal
attributions which have already been made, and are therefore, at best, a make-up for an already
poor performance. Anticipatory excuses are forward-looking, which is to say they function to
decrease the likelihood of an undesirable attribution prior to the relevant action and outcome.
Therefore, anticipatory excuses provide a potential benefit not available to the retrospective
excuse-maker, since these have the “capacity to structure the context within which evaluations
take place so as to obscure the diagnosticity of evaluative feedback or preempt its utility
altogether” (Berglas, 1989, p. 268). That is to say, anticipatory excuses, but not their
retrospective counterpart, might function to proactively corrupt the perceived link between the
actor and outcome prior to any attributions ever being made. In this way, anticipatory excuses
create a sort of win-win situation, since in the case of failure S may explain the outcome away by
appeal to the excuse, while in the case of success S accepts credit for the outcome in spite of that
obstacle.
Putting it all together, self-handicapping can manifest either verbally or behaviorally, but
the empirical literature is widely in agreement that self-handicapping is anticipatory in nature
(Jones & Berglas, 1978; Higgins and Berglas, 1990; Hirt & McCrea, 2001; McCrea, 2008,
2012). So, self-handicapping is not an attempt to make up for a failure, but to proactively
prevent the potential for blame prior to any performance. Formally, “self-handicapping refers to
the strategic creation or claiming of barriers to one’s own success prior to a performance in order
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to protect evaluations of the self” (McCrea, 2012, p. 76). These “barriers” to success serve the
role of deflecting blame away from S, as is the case in standard excuse-making.
In verbal or claimed self-handicapping, S simply avows (whether sincerely or not) the
existence of an external impediment to their success prior to performance. For instance, in
investigating the claimed self-handicapping strategies of competitive athletes, studies have
replicated the finding that athletes in stressful, evaluative contexts are more likely to make
claims prior to performance like, “I am feeling tired,” or “I am having personal concerns in this
moment” (Coudeyville et al, 2008, p. 671; ; Martin & Brawley, 2002). Now, these claimed
excuses may be wholly accurate or entirely fabricated, but the essence of an excuse lies in its
function, not the truth value of its composite propositions.
As an example, Smith, Snyder & Handelsman (1982) assessed the claim selfhandicapping behavior of individuals reporting high levels of generalized (dispositional) test
anxiety. Participants first completed a survey measuring levels of text anxiety across contexts.
Then they were led to believe that they would complete an examination which, the researchers
(falsely) claimed, is a reliable measure of general intelligence and accurately predicts future
success. This condition creates a direct link between the results and the respective identities of
test-takers, likely motivating individual self-protective behavior.
Moreover, subjects were then randomly assigned to receive one of the following
additional (again false) claims in addition to the test instructions:
(i)

that test anxious individuals were likely to underperform11 (excuse condition);

“Although the [test] is a good measure of intelligence, it is negatively affected by the
person's level of anxiety. In other words, people who are typically anxious or nervous when they
take tests tend to get a score that is significantly below their true level of ability. These
people…have better intellectual abilities than their score on the test would suggest” (Smith,
Snyder, Handelsman, 1982, p. 317).
11
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(ii)
test anxiety has no effect on performance (no excuse condition) 12; or,
(iii) no information about this relation (neutral).
In all, the test was divided into two main sections, and an anxiety questionnaire measured
reported levels experienced in completion of part one; also included was a survey related to the
effort exerted on the first portion.
When compared to individuals reporting relatively lower levels of generalized test
anxiety, those high in trait test anxiety were more likely to claim situational anxiety prior to
performance, which is exactly what we should expect; the nature of the assessment is inherently
anxiety inducing and these people are most responsive to the relevant threat. However, when we
look to intragroup differences, the findings become a bit more complex.
Those in the excuse condition reliably self-handicapped at a greater rate than those in the
no excuse condition, irrespective of individual differences in general anxiety. The best
explanation for this is that at least some individuals in the study took advantage of the explicit
opportunity to self-handicap provided by the excuse, while perhaps others may have felt more
empowered to voice genuine anxiety after being informed of its excuse value. Even though the
evaluation is by its nature relatively nerve-wracking for test-takers, there is no reason for those
low in dispositional test anxiety to report higher levels of state anxiety uniquely in those cases in
which anxiety is expressly offered an excuse, unless this situational function of anxiety explains
(at least, to some degree) why it is these individuals reported their state as such. Furthermore,
since we see a rise in reported test anxiety despite levels of generalized anxiety, there is reason to
believe that even those who sincerely experienced anxiety in the moment were more likely to
report their state if made aware of its excuse value; this is likely responsible for some reports

“One of the advantages of [this test], as compared to other intelligence tests, is that it is
not in any way affected by other factors, such as test anxiety, which can make accurate
measurement of intelligence difficult” (p. 317).
12
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among those with greater levels of generalized anxiety. So, at least, it seems that the direct
indication of anxiety as an excuse value motivates some people to report it, regardless of their
actual affective state.
However, perhaps surprisingly, while the results showed that the explicit mention of the
excuse reliably produced an increase in claimed state anxiety, the influence was not as significant
as we might expect. Moreover, among high trait anxiety individuals, those in the excuse
condition claimed test anxiety with less frequency than those provided no information.
Therefore, those most likely to claim test anxiety were individuals with high levels of general
anxiety who were provided no explicit information about the effect of test anxiety on
performance. These individuals claimed test anxiety at a substantially higher rate than those in
the no excuse condition.
Now, initially we may suspect that these findings expose a flaw in the excuse
interpretation of self-handicapping. If people want to make an excuse for themselves, why not
take advantage when the opportunity is right under our nose? The explanation is relatively
simple: the most effective excuses are those in which the target does not recognize S’s intention
to excuse—exculpate—themselves from blame. Excuses work when the explanation is
ostensibly true and the target does not suspect the excuse-maker to be engaged in an attempt to
merely save face or get off the hook. When we intentionally offer a deceptive excuse to another,
our efforts will fail if it is obvious that the expression is designed with the function of deflecting
blame. Therefore, the findings suggest that high test anxious subjects felt the excuse to be “too
obvious” for the audience when made explicit (Self, 1990, p. 54), but when the excuse is
available without being rendered obvious, the findings suggest such a situation produces the
optimal time to offer an excuse. Those in the excuse condition are aware of the potential
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function of self-reported anxiety, and perhaps some of those genuinely experiencing anxiety
were positively motivated not to report it exactly because they did not want to make an excuse
for themselves, or to be perceived as attempting to.
Indeed, self-reported test anxiety was most common among those with a high level of
general test anxiety when the handicap was available, but remained implicit (Smith, Snyder, &
Handelsman, 1982, p. 319). This much suggests that some strategy is involved here; individuals’
reports are responsive to available self-protective resources. For more evidence of selective selfreporting, the analysis also showed that those in the no-excuse condition systematically reported
lower levels of effort, with high trait anxious individuals reporting the lowest levels of effort.
There is reason to believe, then, that the no-excuse condition motivates a search for another
potentially available excuse across the board. Specifically, that high trait anxious people report
the lowest levels suggests that those most threatened by the test are those most driven to find an
exculpatory source of blame.
Undoubtedly, for some people in this setting and other similar evaluative contexts, the
intention which underlies excuse-making is to deceive an external audience, or those who make
the final evaluation; the intent is to mislead the audience into attributing test anxiety to the
performance on the exam, all in hopes of manipulating casual attributions. For others, the
claimed anxiety was likewise undoubtedly genuine, and an innocent representation of their inner
experience, such that anxiety in fact was responsible for the outcome.
This suggests that self-handicapping behavior can be strategically employed, depending
on the psychological set of the individual and the setting in which the task takes place. But, this
much does not indicate intentional, nor even strategic, self-deception. The strategic element of
self-handicapping is necessary to show intentional self-deception, but plainly insufficient. So, in

28

turn, we need more evidence which points to intention in action in order to substantiate the
claims related to self-deception. As we find, such evidence is particularly pronounced in
instances in which the excuse-making venture manifests behaviorally, rather than as the mere
claims of an individual.
Behavioral Self-Handicapping
Behavioral self-handicapping keeps much of the same structure and function as its verbal
counterpart. Just like claimed self-handicapping, the action or pattern of actions are proactively
employed as a means of facilitating self-serving attributions, except in these cases S actively
constructs or acquires an impediment to success in the task prior to performance. In these cases,
then, the excuse really does feature in an objective explanation of the outcome; S makes the task
more challenging than required of them, and therefore these behaviors become an important
determinate of the outcome. In case of failure, the obstacle deflects blame away from S, and
should S succeed, however, the obstacle functions to make the performance look all the more
impressive.
In their seminal study on behavioral self-handicapping, Jones & Berglas, (1978)
demonstrated that participants could be manipulated into selectively consuming what they
believed to be a performance-inhibiting drug when doing so provided a functional excuse for
poor performance. Here, researchers instructed students that their participation was part of a trial
comparing the relative effects of two new drugs on cognition functioning. In order to examine
these effects, students were led to believe that each would complete two exams sequentially, and
as usual these exams purported to measure innate intelligence. Participants were subject to one
of the following two experimental conditions: In one, participants were given a set of questions
containing four very easy questions and sixteen questions which contained no logically possible
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solution – trick questions, in other words. However, individuals in this condition nonetheless
universally received feedback indicating success, no matter their actual scores. This is the “noncontingent” condition, and is a commonly employed set-up in experiments like these. The
situation commonly creates an experience of difficulty and uncertainty in participants, since the
insoluble questions should be perceived as particularly more difficult, and not immediately
reconcilable with feedback indicating success. In the second condition, however, participants
were subject to more mundane conditions, completing an exam which contained reasonably
challenging, though ultimately solvable, problems. Further, in this condition, participants were
given accurate feedback indicating success or failure – the “contingent” condition, since
feedback corresponds to actual performance.13
The groups completed the first portion, at which point participants were given the
opportunity to choose freely between one of two available drugs (placebos). It was explained
that one of these drugs is ostensibly performance-enhancing while the other was described as
producing performance-inhibiting effects, so subjects were led to believe that the subsequent
exam would measure the drug’s effect on performance but subjects were given the opportunity to
choose freely.
In all, those in the non-contingent setting were significantly more likely to select the
performance-inhibiting drug prior to completing the second round of evaluation, even after
having been informed of its effects.14 When researchers asked those in this group to justify their

The average scores were between 12 and 14 correct answers out of 20 questions. With
an average between 60%-70%, it seems that these problem sets were fairly challenging, but
neither extremely easy nor difficult.
14
Researchers found differences between the tendencies of male and female participants
in this condition. 70% of males selected the performance-inhibiting drug, while only 46% of
women chose this option. The role of sex differences in self-handicapping tendencies is a
contentious issue, not particularly relevant to this work.
13
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choice, recipients of non-contingent feedback often claimed a motivation to assist in or
contribute to the study. That is, a substantial portion those in the non-contingent group claimed
that “they were helping to make the experiment ‘work’ because, having scored 16 out of 20 on
the first test, they had more room for downward than upward movement. Thus, [they claimed]
the effects of the drug could be easier to see…” (p. 412).
There are a few things to notice going on here: First, this appears to be an example of
some rather sophisticated rationalizing on part of participants in explaining the motivations for
their decision against the alternative, which we will find to be a common theme in selfhandicapping. Moreover, we should take notice that, while on the one hand, self-handicapping
of this sort shields against future blame, on the other, it functions in protecting or enhancing an
existing self-image by indicating a novel or unusual feature of situations producing failure which
is likely absent in past cases of (non-self-handicapping) success. That is to say, selfhandicappers may comfort themselves by concluding from the immediate evidence, “You know,
it is true that the only time I fail at this kind of thing is when I do X [whatever the selfhandicapping behavior]. I succeed when I give my best effort.” Even if this correlation between
effort and outcome generally holds, however, the mere fact that S did not actively sabotage
success in previous task iterations does not in turn entail that the success reveals any innate
talent, though S will almost certainly interpret the evidence in this way. S’s self-belief as
dispositionally talented, while perhaps not necessarily false, nor even immediately contradictory
to the available evidence, is certainly not the belief best supported by the task outcome in the
relevant context.
In all, the non-contingent condition induces unease in the participants about their levels
of competency, as feedback indicating success likely contrasts with their internal experience and
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expectations given insolvable nature of the task set, while reinforcing self-doubt in the case of
failure. Given that the task in this condition was composed primarily of trick problems, there is
little reason to expect that participants experienced much, if any, internal confidence in their
responses. However, after being presented with success feedback, those in the non-contingent
condition ought to be motivated to accept positive feedback, and therefore subsequently selfhandicap as a method of protecting and enhancing this welcomed self-belief. The Jones &
Berglas study exemplifies the paradigm set-up for empirical investigations of self-handicapping.
The use of drugs or alcohol is only one common example of self-handicapping, and
strategies may exhibit more or less nuance and finesse in locating, acquiring, or constructing a
workable excuse. Generally, however, I will advance the claim that many instances of this
behavior are instances of intentional self-deception. My arguments are substantially informed by
the empirical literature, and yet even though this information is foundational to my arguments,
there is simply a profusion of available evidence tracking the finer details of the motivations,
strategies, and consequences associated with behavioral self-handicapping. Therefore, I will
remain as faithful as possible to the empirical evidence, but I make no attempts to provide a
comprehensive account of self-handicapping. I will do my best then to provide the most
straightforward, garden variety cases of self-handicapping as situated in the discussion of
intentional self-deception. The behaviors I have in mind ought to be familiar to most; my
arguments will not rely on an especially involved understanding of the inner workings of selfhandicapping. Proceeding, then, I provide some further empirical support that self-handicapping
is prima facie self-deception, afterwards arguing for the Intentionalist account.
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Section Four: Self-Handicapping Behavior as Intentional Self-Deception
In order to show self-handicapping as a prima facie example of self-deceptive cognition,
I rely primarily on empirical evidence to bolster, what I hope, are common sense examples.
There are plenty of brow-raising studies which illustrate a shrewd, wily self-handicapper who is
capable of mending behaviors as demands require without missing a step. While interesting as
these examples in fact are, the results do not supply the clearest representation of self-deception.
So, after these perfunctory remarks, in my subsequent arguments about self-deception I employ a
more familiar, standardly philosophical methodology.
The studies mentioned so far supply some elementary evidence that self-handicapping is
self-deceptive in some cases. Most basically, recall the findings in (Smith, Snyder, and
Handelsman, 198), which showed an increased propensity to self-handicap when the handicap
remained available, but only implicitly – neither rejected nor explicitly expressed as an excuse.
One interpretation of these findings is that, when expressly mentioned, the excuse is too obvious
to be of use in manipulating an external audience’s attributions. However, an alternative
explanation is that perhaps self-handicapping behavior is most likely when the excuse is
implicitly acknowledged, because the excuse provides an opportunity to self-deceive. On this
understanding, implicit excuses are valuable because absent explicit acknowledgment of the
excuse, not only does is the explanation more effective when directed externally, but the task
context is moreover one in which S may self-handicap without reflexively acknowledging their
own motivations and the function of their behavior.
Now, while the empirical literature produced in social psychology has consistently
recognized the connection between self-deception and self-handicapping, though often directing
analyses toward only the first of these potential explanations. For instance, Higgins & Snyder
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(1988) define self-deception as “the process of having two antithetical self-relevant beliefs such
that the more negative belief is motivationally held less within awareness” (p. 240), arguing that
self-deception allows us to “deal with the fact that [we] have engaged in…excuse-making. The
typical solution to this problem is for people to assert to themselves (and often to others) that
they have…reasons for their seeming bad actions (i.e., making excuses)” (p. 241). Similarly
Snyder and Higgins (1990) argue that as a feature of self-handicapping behavior the “primary
importance of self-deception…[is that] it enables the individual to maintain his or her focus on
external task concerns rather than being caught up in conscious self-contemplation regarding a
negative performance (including the excuse, itself)” (p. 103). Said otherwise, the authors claim
the greatest benefit of self-deception to self-handicapping is that it allows us to engage in the
excuse-making behavior without being burdened by the conscious awareness of our own
motivations or the function of our actions. This is surely correct as I see it, but the very fact that
we must psychologically “deal with” our excuse-making behavior tacitly indicates that there is a
role for self-deception in self-handicapping logically prior to that of suppressing awareness, and I
am therefore doubtful that the primary importance of self-deception is found in this actionsustaining function.
Instead, this supervening function of self-handicapping behavior is that of tangible, selfdeceptive evidence manipulation; self-handicapping produces evidential contexts conducive to
self-deception. When the target audience for the excuse is internal (i.e., self-directed), selfhandicapping behavior is that pattern of actions by which S manipulates the available evidence.
So, if this function is primary, it follows that the value of self-deception as that state which
sustains the behavior is only derivatively valuable insofar as it is, in turn, a means of achieving
the broader, deceptive end of evidence manipulation. It is undoubtedly true that self-deception
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facilitates self-handicapping as initially explained, via the suppression of conscious awareness,
but in taking a second glance at the relationship, notice that in positing such a role for selfdeception, we only push the goalpost further back: if self-deception functions to suppress
reflexive awareness of the underlying motivation or intention in excuse-making, what features of
self-handicapping qua evidence manipulation necessitate this function (or nonetheless make it a
useful one)? Though it may seem obvious, some brief analysis is justifiable for clarity’s sake.
So, why think that successful self-handicapping involves self-deceptive repression of our
awareness as involved in excuse-making?
In arguing that the primary role of self-deception in self-handicapping is to repress
reflexive awareness of the behavior itself, we risk overlooking the fact that self-handicapping is
not itself an end which, by definition, is only achievable in virtue of this conscious unawareness.
That is, there is nothing conceptually inherent to self-handicapping, as may be the case in selfdeception, which renders concurrent self-awareness fundamentally paradoxical in the
implementation of that behavior, and there is no a priori reason to believe that reflexive
conscious awareness of self-handicapping is alone sufficient to render the plan ineffective.
Instead, it must be something about the goal of evidence manipulation which renders selfhandicapping impossible upon reflexive awareness of one’s behavior. So, in order to understand
the features of self-handicapping which render it potentially self-undermining, it is necessary to
first indicate the primary goal of self-handicapping.
As we will find from the empirical evidence, the self-protective function of selfhandicapping is usually fulfilled by S’s retaining or enhancing a desired self-image. In order to
achieve this, self-handicapping constitutes the behavioral process evidence manipulation which
facilitates the self-deceptive maintenance of that image, and by definition the behavior works
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toward this goal at the expense of accuracy and objectivity. So, let’s back up: self-handicapping
is a means to a primary goal of self-protection. Therefore, it is this self-protective end which
ultimately governs self-handicapping. If this self-protection requires of S the so described
suppression of reflexive awareness, it must be that this self-protective is therefore the source of
value for self-deception.
Though not accounted for within the self-handicapping paradigm elsewhere in the
prominent literature, this relationship between self-awareness of successful self-deception is
standard fare for the philosophy of self-deception as essentially a reformulation of the dynamic
paradox. In these cases, self-handicapping just is a method of self-deceptive manipulation, and
this in turn explains the self-undermining nature of reflexive awareness. Self-handicapping is
employed toward the end of self-deception, and if we are to catch ourselves aware of our selfhandicapping, this too implicates the potentially poor foundation of the beliefs predicated on
self-handicapping. One cannot, for instance, self-handicap as a means of retaining a desirable
self-image as a superior basketball player, while at the same time consciously aware of the
behavior as designed to make ambivalent, or further corrupt, the proper causal attribution of my
skill to the outcome of my play. So, when self-handicapping is geared toward self-protection, the
behavior is the active process of self-deceptive evidence manipulation.
To see how this process comes together, we may look to the findings of Hirt and McCrea
(2001) which showed that individuals who self-handicapped (in that case, failed to adequately
prepare prior to the exam) performed worse on the relevant assessment than the average
participant, but moreover, consistently attributed their performance to the handicap (failing to
practice), and most interestingly, rated their competence in academic psychology (the subject of
the assessment) as superior despite the significantly poorer performances on average (p. 1386).
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Now, it is commonly recognized that self-handicapping positively impacts state self-esteem, as
captured classification of the behavior as essentially self-protective, though the explanation for
these findings is still somewhat contentious. In this study, however, researchers found that selfhandicappers reported inflated self-beliefs about specific domain competence, and that this in
turn mediated boosts to self-esteem. Compared to the non-handicapping group, selfhandicappers consistently reported inflated self-beliefs about their competence in psychology,
but interestingly, without reporting either an inflated sense of general academic ability nor
competence in domains outside of academics. Moreover, high levels of self-esteem did not
influence self-reported ability judgments; those with high self-esteem were not more likely to
report superior ability in psychology. Rather, self-handicapping produced high levels of selfperceived domain competence among self-handicappers, in turn generating higher levels of posttest self-esteem.
Self-handicapping functions to retain or enhance ability beliefs about a fairly specific
domain, which, in turn contributes to global self-worth (p. 1389). The mechanics of this process
rely on the generation and content of counterfactual thoughts.15 Counterfactual thoughts are just
those which identify some way in which a past outcome might have turned out differently, and
these play a crucial role in task performance and affect regulation. There are two kinds of these:
upward and downward counterfactual thoughts. Upward thoughts indicate how a past
performance might have produced a superior outcome (“If I would have studied more, I would
have gotten a better grade.”), and downward thoughts focus on the ways in which an outcome
might have been worse than it was in fact (“At least I got a ‘C’; I could have failed altogether.”).
Now, in typical conditions, upward thoughts induce negative affect by making salient some
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For a thorough review, see (Epstude & Roese, 2008).
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relative shortcomings or disadvantages compared to an imagined ideal. Likewise, downward
thoughts generally produce positive affect, since these highlight the ways that we are better off
than we may have otherwise been. Interestingly, though, in the case of self-handicapping, the
affective impact inverts, such that upward counterfactual thoughts engender a positive state, and
vice versa.
For example, in McCrea (2008) the results showed that upward counterfactual thinking
reliably produces positive affect, but only if the content of that upward counterfactual made
salient an available handicap as an excuse. So, in this case, participants entered expecting to
complete an evaluative assessment, and were then grouped in two: one group receiving the
option of up to ten minutes of study time prior to the assessment (practice condition), while the
other group received no such chance (no practice condition). In order to induce handicapping via
a failure in preparation, researchers claimed to those in the no practice condition that a computer
glitch mistakenly produced uneven groups, and that too many people were assigned to this
condition. Then, these participants were asked if they would not mind joining the practice
condition for the sake of the experiment. Likewise, in the practice condition, participants were
led to believe that the no practice condition had been over-assigned, and subsequently asked to
the other condition, ostensibly forgoing practice for the sake of even group sizes and fair
experimental results. Researchers, however, reiterated that the decision was the participant’s to
make freely, and that there would be no repercussions for declining to switch conditions.
Importantly, all participants received non-contingent feedback of failure, so the motive to selfprotect ought to have been present and salient.
Finally, after completing the exam, participants were asked to report any of their thoughts
structured as, “If only I… / At least I…”, thus priming responses in the form of upward and
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downward thoughts. Respondents also reported their current mood, state self-esteem, and most
importantly, the degree to which they attributed their effort in practice to their performance.
Those in the practice condition generated significantly fewer upward thoughts related to practice,
while those in the no-practice condition regularly mentioned practice time in their responses.
Participants believed that they had freely chosen whether or not to practice, so for those in the
practice condition, it follows from a self-protective motive that this group ought to generate
upward thoughts unrelated to practice, in order to deflect responsibility from themselves. By that
some token, participants who chose to switch conditions and forgo practice reliably appealed to
this lack of preparation in reporting upward thoughts. So, somewhat paradoxically, those who
chose to practice were less likely to indicate that practice as responsible for the outcome when
feedback revealed failure, while those who actively turned down the opportunity to practice
readily suggested this lack as the explanation for failure. Whether practice was a salient feature
in the content of counterfactual thoughts depended upon whether the practice condition
exculpated the participant of their performance; in the case of failure, choosing not to practice
explains away the outcome, while failing in spite of practice deals an even greater blow to the
self-image. The empirical results from this study are congruent with this explanation.
By making salient the lack of practice in explaining task failure, upward counterfactuals
afford the opportunity for S to locate the source of blame externally; at least in the sense of
external to S’s inherent or innate features. Apparently, even though these individuals believed
that they had chosen to skip practice, this lack of preparation accounted for the contents of their
We have good reason to believe, then, that not only were these individuals motivated to blame
inadequate practice time for failure, but that these attributions occurred without accompanying
contrition related to the participant’s (perceived) free decision to skip preparation. In short, these
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participants were ready to blame a lack of practice, but did not experience guilt in failing to
prepare when given the chance.
Interestingly, though, given the self-inflation consequent to these upward thoughts, those
in the no-practice condition, were less likely to report an intention to practice in the future. That
is, even though the self-reported upward thoughts of those in the no practice condition regularly
indicated a lack of preparation as responsible for failure, these participants reported no resultant
increase motivation to practice in the future. However, researchers then altered the conditions as
to lead participants to believe that each individual would receive two attempts at the assessment;
and in this case, upward counterfactuals in the practice condition then predicted an increased
intention to practice in the future. When given only one opportunity for evaluation, it seems that
those in the no practice condition were satisfied to reflect upon an excuse, but were not
motivated by this reflection to alter future behavior, suggesting that the individuals were
motivated by self-protection at least slightly more than performance or accurate diagnostic
information.
Thus, these findings suggest that counterfactual thinking plays a role in forming
intentions, and thus in future task performance, only if accompanied by negative affect – only if
the upward thought does not make salient a handicap which excuses the performance. And,
upward thoughts which enhance or maintain affect do not reliably motivate a future intention to
exert more effort in preparation for the task, suggesting the self-protective reward is the sought
after benefit, even if sacrificing domain competence as a result. Supporting these findings,
Flamm and McCrea (2012) found that when people are motivated by “improvement or have
already addressed self-protection concerns, upward counterfactuals concerning a lack of effort
increase subsequent persistence and facilitate performance….On the other hand, when
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individuals are faced with an ego-threatening failure, they may generate and interpret upward
counterfactuals in a manner that excuses this poor performance…By reducing self-blame and
negative affect, excusing upward counterfactuals undermine motivation to improve in the
future.” (p. 379).
Similarly, Mercier (2017) examined the role of “prefactual” thinking in selfhandicapping, and in relation to counterfactual thoughts. Prefactuals, contra counterfactuals, are
just those thoughts which indicate how outcomes might be different in a future iteration. In this
study, participants received random feedback indicating success or failure16, and were then
primed17 to generate either prefactual or counterfactual thoughts about the outcome. Results
showed that the responses in the counterfactual condition, irrespective of success or failure
feedback, tended to make salient uncontrollable features of the test situation. These features
were sometimes internal to the person (i.e., “If I were good at this sort of game”), while others
focused on external factors (“If more time was allotted for the test”).18 Yet, although this pattern
held in both the success and failure condition, the propensity to offer counterfactuals was most
pronounced in the case of failure, which Mercier and his colleagues argue indicates a tendency to
(quasi-)spontaneously generate exculpatory counterfactual thoughts in the event of failure.
In another iteration of Mercier (2017), researchers tasked participants with a timed logic
assessment, only this time providing immediate, contingent (accurate) feedback. In the task,

Compared to an imaginary average.
So, those in the success condition were instructed to recall how things might turn out
worse next, and those in the failure condition were instructed to recall how things might be better
next time. To ‘prime’ a counterfactual response, participants were instructed to complete the
phrase, “Things would have been better for me if…” Alternatively, to prime prefactual
responses, researchers altered the phrase to read, “Things will be better for me in the next game
if…” (p. 263).
18
There is no data provided indicating the frequency of internal or external explanations.
16
17
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participants we given a set of 10 logic problems and instructed to complete as many as possible
within a twenty second limit; completion of all ten problems within the timeframe indicates
success, and completion of any less than 10 in this time was deemed a failure. Here, participants
were again randomly assigned to a counterfactual or prefactual condition, rather than allowed to
spontaneously and independently generate thoughts. The experiment replicated findings from
the previous study indicating a general propensity to generate uncontrollable counterfactual
thoughts, though perhaps indicating a more pronounced motivation to self-protect when
presented with accurate feedback. Irrespective of success or failure, only 12% of counterfactual
responses appealed to controllable behaviors in this study (p. 265).
Fleshing out the distinction, the content of controllable counterfactuals makes salient the
aspects responsible for failure which are seemingly under out control, and are structured roughly
as “If I had done X [instead of Y] things likely would have turned out better.” So, it makes sense
that those disposed to self-protect are least likely to generate these thoughts; the content of this
thought is strictly antithetical to the self-protective project since controllable behavior is that
which is under the individual’s control, that which could have been done otherwise, thus directly
place blame in the hands of the individual in question. Alternatively, in the prefactual condition,
researchers led participants to believe that the study included two rounds of assessment, and
respondents reported their thoughts in between sections. Likewise, when primed to generate
prefactuals, the content of the thoughts highlighted controllable features of the task performance.
So far, then, results indicate a propensity to focus on uncontrollable aspects of the task situation
when recalling past failures, and the opposite tendency to generate thoughts related to
controllable aspects of our own behavior when framed in light of a future goal.
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Most interestingly, though, researchers finally altered experimental conditions once more,
this time providing accurate feedback, but furthe instructing some participants to offer responses
which ought to be valuable to a “future self” or another test-taker who would complete the
assessment at a later time (p. 265). Therefore, here the researchers deliberately requested a
prefactual response meant to focus on controllable aspects of the performance. When explicitly
instructed to provide this kind of advice, participants from both conditions reliably generated
prefactual thoughts that focused on controllable aspects of the task situation. Together, these
findings suggest a general preference for uncontrollable counterfactuals in virtue of their selfprotective use, but also that participants nonetheless retain some objective, diagnostic
information that may be introspectively accessed with relative ease.
This diagnostic information is that which an individual ought to be most motivated to
avoid in self-protection, since it highlights our own potential responsibility for failure and the
ways we might improve upon our performance, both of which locate the individual as the
primary source of responsibility. The only apparent variable responsible for this shift in
perspective is the introduction of the prefactual (advice) instruction, therefore suggesting that a
shift in goal-orientation is sufficient for the generation of objective, accurate responses.
Participants compelled to abdicate themselves of responsibility, therefore, are seemingly not
ignorant of the proper attribution, but apparently not motivated to attend to that evidence.
The Nature of Belief in Self-Deceptive Self-Handicapping
From the findings presented, we have good reason to believe self-handicapping behavior
is intimately related to, or reliant upon, self-deception in many cases. Hirt and McCrea (2001)
suggest that self-handicapping functions in the retention of valued self-beliefs related to fairly
specific ability, in turn contributing to global self-esteem as a result. This pursuit of a desired
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belief is a paradigm instance of the motivations which drive self-deception. Furthermore,
McCrea (2008) argues that we receive an esteem boost when generating excuses for our failures,
so long as those excuses do not implicate a valued feature of our identity. And, in these
situations, we saw that such reflection impedes future intentions to practice, suggesting a
stronger motivation to self-protect by means of self-belief regulation rather than by way of skill
development or task performance.
Pulling it together, some of the strongest evidence of self-deception is from the Mercier
(2017) study, which indicate that a rather thinly veiled wall shields objective information from
interfering with the maintenance of a desired self-image. As we saw, when not primed to frame
our thoughts as future-directed, our default thought processes focus on uncontrollable features of
previous task situations in which we previously failed. But, even those who initially offer a
counterfactual explanation were capable, with apparently little effort, of producing useful advice
the content of which made salient controllable behaviors, and seem instead to avoid such
thoughts unless prompted by deliberate request or by a situational reframing of the goal (Flamm
& McCrea, 2012). In conjunction, these findings suggest that objective information is available
to the self-handicapper, but that these individuals may selectively repress such knowledge toward
the self-deceptive end.
Now, we may turn back our analysis to the original explanation of the of self-deception in
self-handicapping. Snyder & Higgins (1990) are right to point out that a key function of selfdeception in sustaining self-handicapping is that “by being unaware of our excuses, we avoid
having to excuse ourselves for making them” (p. 103). We have seen that self-handicapping
reliably produces enhanced self-beliefs and boosts to self-esteem, and unless the excuse making
intention is suppressed from consciousness, it is unclear how we might account for the
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measurable, positive impacts on the self. The fact that individuals reliably rate themselves as
superior in the relevant domain after successfully self-handicapping, and in turn experience gains
in mood and global self-esteem, indicates more that these folks believe, rather than simply avow,
inflated self-beliefs related to domain skill.
In all, we may begin to notice a two-tiered, or an internal/external, structure in the
relation between self-deception and self-handicapping in these cases. That is to say, the selfdeception which facilitates the self-handicapping process itself via suppression of conscious
awareness is subsidiary to the self-handicapping behaviors since these are means of selfdeceptive evidence manipulation. The process is futile without the second-level deception. The
second-level deception is fundamentally internal, by which I mean that the deception is
constituted primarily by the selective rationalization and retrieval of values, memories, or
motivations, and not directed at corrupting the external evidence. The self-handicapping
behavior is then external self-deception, in that this process involves actively altering or blurring
the available evidence. Nonetheless, however we might best classify the self-deceptive
cognitions in self-handicapping, no robust categories are required in advancing my claims that
intentional self-deception is exemplified in the behavior.
What seems clear, though, is that this process involves something like the psychological
partitioning accounts espoused in Davidson (2004) and Pears (1984). Recall, these accounts
claim that the mind is segregated, “partitioned,” and that beliefs may mutually reside in distinct
realms without conscious contradiction. The empirical evidence suggests a great deal of selfhandicapping involves the insulation of objective diagnostic information, motivations in task
approach, and values or desires, from the self-handicapper’s conscious explanations for
performance. However, as we saw, shifts in motivation often entail a revision in the self-
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handicapper’s epistemic framework toward a more objective, less vicious orientation. The
suppression of undesirable conscious awareness is therefore best explained as a strategy in
pursuit of self-deception, since it is the transition away from the goal of self-protective belief
formation which apparently halts the self-handicapping process, and thereby renders such
repression obsolete.
In all, we see that self-deception facilitates self-handicapping in masking the individual
from their own motivations, while the self-handicapping behavior itself is self-deceptive in the
active sense, as the method by which one deceives themselves. In all, it is likely unhelpful to
chart this process in terms of which self-deception is temporally prior to the other, since the
behavior and cognitions are mutually reinforcing, and there is not evident method by which one
might mark the end of self-deceptive thought suppression compared to the beginning of
behavioral self-handicapping. Likewise, behavioral self-handicapping undoubtedly affects not
only domain specific self-beliefs, but our behaviors also alter our propensity and ability to
engage in the second-order, self-deceptive suppression of motivation. The process is cyclical.
Self-Handicapping & Intention
Imagine Alex, a struggling law student who is threatened by the prospect of failing her
final exams. She came to the program thinking of herself as naturally superior to others in terms
of intellect, having been handed success for most of her life. However, she is now beginning to
wonder about the accuracy of her self-image, as the work in law school is significantly more
challenging than that to which she is accustomed. She worries that if she fails to prove her
intelligence on her exams, then her entire self-image will come into question. Not only is this
outcome threatening to Alex’s global well-being, additionally she worries whether she is even
capable of burdening such an identity crisis while maneuvering her schoolwork. Though, for all
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these creeping doubts, Alex nonetheless believes in her innate advantage over others, and is
deeply motivated to retain that self-image.
As final exams approach, Alex cannot seem to garner the motivation to study, finding
herself catching up on lost sleep or watching her favorite television programs for hours on end.
Alex knows that prudence dictates studying as the most reasonable course of action, and feels
guilty for her lack of motivation. Ultimately, however, Alex reassures herself that her talent is
sufficient to overcome any deficit in preparation. To build confidence, she recalls all of the times
in her college calculus course that she aced the exams without studying at all, and these bring
some relief to her guilt. Finally, on the night before finals, Alex tries to cram as much reading in
as possible, scrambling to make up for lost time.
She arrives to the exam sleepy and in no shape to perform her best; still, she reflects on
all that success in calculus to quell her worries. Alex exits the exam, though, feeling quite
confident about her performance, and relieved to finally shed her concerns about performance
and preparation. And, when grades are returned, Alex finds that she her results are congruent
with the class average, finishing right around the 50th percentile. Not a terrible outcome, but not
that to which Alex is familiar, and surely not one indicative of innate academic virtue. “Well, I
know I could have done it if I really tried,” Alex thinks, “I know I am still smarter than the other
students. I am sure I will show them next time.”
Alex is self-deceived. She is using her lack of preparation to excuse an average grade,
and in doing so retains her self-belief as intellectually superior. Whether the long-term evidence
supports her self-image as intelligent is a separate question from the immediate deception: the
evidence available, her preparation and performance, warrants an epistemic down-shift in the
strength of Alex’s self-beliefs, but instead this evidence functions to strengthen these beliefs. If
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Alex were to engage in a good-faith effort in studying and otherwise preparing for the exam, but
only to come up short in the grade, she must confront unwelcomed evidence which suggests that,
even at her best, her self-image as natively intelligent is fatally gilded. But, by proactively
engaging in behaviors which clearly facilitate underperformance, Alex creates a context in which
an underperformance can be attributed to those behaviors. Alex infers a belief about her own
intellectual superiority and innate qualities from evidence which supports a conflicting, if not
contradictory, conclusion.
Mele (2001) mentions examples which, on the surface, appear quite analogous to those
behaviors described thus far:
“Ann believes that she can cultivate the trait of kindness in herself by acting as if
she were kind; so, because she wants to become kind, she decides to embark on a
program of acting as if she were kind, and she acts accordingly. Because Bob would
like to be a generous person, he finds pleasure in actions of his that are associated
with the trait; consequently, Bob has hedonic motivation to act as if he were
generous, and he sometimes acts accordingly. Unlike Ann, Bob is not trying to
inculcate the desired trait in himself.
… It is easy to imagine that, after some time, Ann and Bob infer, largely from their
relevant behavior, that they have the desired trait, even though they in fact lack it.
However, from the facts that these agents want it to be true that p, intentionally act
as if p owing significantly to their wanting p to be true, and come to believe that p
largely as a consequence of that intentional behavior, it does not follow that they
were trying to deceive themselves into believing that p or trying to make it easier
for themselves to believe that p. Ann may simply have been trying to make herself
kind and Bob may merely have been seeking the pleasure that acts associated with
generosity give him.” (pp. 19-20)
Ann’s case can be excluded from the outset, since her motivation is to “inculcate the
desired trait” in herself, while the motivation to self-handicap is not to develop or
embody a trait, but to retain the self-belief about the possession of that trait. The case of
Bob, who merely desires to act generously, without any motivation to be a generous
person, is a bit of a trickier case. Suppose Bob is placed in some situation in which levels
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of generosity are salient, but for whatever reason, Bob is particularly dissuaded from
acting generously but retains his desire to be generous. Then, suppose he constructs
some obstacle in order to self-handicap and form an excuse explaining why, on this
occasion he cannot display his claimed or desired levels of generosity. Whether
motivated by hedonistic desire, in both cases Bob may act as if he is generous, retaining
his favorable self-image, but may accomplish this through very different behaviors.
What we see is that Bob may come to believe himself to be generous either by
self-handicapping or by plainly acting in a generous fashion; and, as Mele notes,
sometimes he does act as such. The fact that Bob engages in pretense via selfhandicapping, as opposed to the genuine behavior, indicates the substitution of valued
belief retention in place of generous behavior. Ann’s and Bob’s respective cases may
illustrate examples of agents who are self-deceived on account of inferred explanations
for their own behavior, and biased interpretations of these observations fuel selfdeception here in much the same way as in self-handicapping. But, whatever Mele’s
original examples say about self-deception, they are not instances of self-handicapping.
Importantly, the presence of self-handicapping behavior is evidence of a self-deceptive
motivation, and in asking why self-handicapping is only occasionally employed, we basically
rehash the “selectivity” problem (Burmudez, 2001). The selectivity problem is levied against
Motivationalist accounts on grounds that “the desire that p should be the case is insufficient to
motivate cognitive bias in favour of the belief that p… How are we to distinguish these from
situations in which our desires result in motivational bias?” (p. 317). For the self-handicapper,
both a good-faith effort which leads to success and deceptive behavior might produce the same
self-serving benefits, but obviously these behaviors are mutually exclusive. So, supposing the
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self-imagine concerns might motivate either behavior, it is not clear how the deflationary account
explains the employment of self-handicapping in terms of pure motivation. The Intentionalist
explanation is that the self-handicapper engages in the behavior because of an intention to selfdeceive, in conjunction the fact that self-handicapping is just such an effective means of
successfully implementing that intention. A closer inspection reveals this, I argue, to be
intentional self-deception. However, before I can adequately explain my position here, it is
beneficial in understanding the selectivity problem, and the Motivationalist response, to take a
closer look at Mele’s position.
As we have seen, according to Mele, many motivations may substitute for intention as
that which explains biased evidence manipulation. So, accordingly, on the deflationary position,
it is this motivation which not only sparks the self-deceptive goal, but also that which sustains it.
For Mele, this motivation alone is responsible for self-deceptive bias, and we recall that such
accounts argue that no intention is required to guide and monitor the biased judgment of
evidence (2001, ch. 2-3). At the core of Mele’s account is the notion that the self-deceiver is
primarily engaged in the practice of avoiding costs incurred by the false acceptance or rejection
of the given proposition, such that self-deception most often occurs when acceptance of the false
belief that p is less than the costs associated with falsely rejecting the true proposition, not-p.
However, as also mentioned, Mele allows for extreme, fringe instances of intentional selfdeception. For example:
“Ike, a forgetful prankster skilled at imitating others’ handwriting, has intentionally
deceived friends by secretly making false entries in their diaries. Ike has just
decided to deceive himself by making a false entry in his own diary. Cognizant of
his forgetfulness, he writes under today’s date, ‘I was particularly brilliant in class
today,’ counting on eventually forgetting that what he wrote is false. Weeks later,
when reviewing his diary, Ike reads this sentence and acquires the belief that he was
brilliant in class on the specified day.” (p. 17).
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So, while Mele concedes the theoretical coherence of intentional self-deception, he
argues that such instances are anomalous. However, self-handicapping as illustrated is
not anomalous, and moreover, it is not clear that Mele’s example illustrates a case of
intentional self-deception, because for Ike, whether he self-deceives is dependent upon
whether he forgets his intention in writing the journal entry to himself. This forgetting is
surely not intentional, and as such I would argue that Mele has not here shown an
instance of intentional self-deception. Not only does Ike forget his intention, which
seems to be more than a matter of volition, but at the time of belief acquisition, he seems
to have lost the intention full stop.
While I do not wish to categorically deny the possibility of intentional
forgetfulness, this example does not illustrate the necessary causal link between the initial
intention and the resulting self-deception. Rather, Ike forms an intention to self-deceive,
in turn predicting that his forgetfulness may help accomplish this end, but ultimately
whether he forgets his primary goal is not a matter of intention. His intention to selfdeceive does not explain the acquisition of false belief, but rather his forgetfulness does,
and so there can be no self-deception in cases in which Ike fails to forget, which is
ultimately a matter beyond his control. Thus, the link here between intention and
deception is insufficient to call such self-deception intentional. In the same way that I
may form an intention to win a hand of Texas Hold ‘Em, I nonetheless cannot rightly say
that I intentionally won the hand when the river card turns up in my favor. Even though I
might have possessed the intent to win, it does not entail that I intentionally brought
about those circumstances, since no matter the strength of efficacy of my intentions and
practical reasoning, a key factor in determining the outcome is fundamentally out of my
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control. Well, this is like Ike. His self-deception is best explained by his forgetfulness,
over which he does not possess control in a manner sufficient to render his forgetting
intentional in nature. Ike’s case is not the strongest example of intentional self-deception,
and Mele is right that, if we assume the phenomenon is explained as such, then we need
pay it little attention. But self-handicapping offers a significantly better illustration.
Recall Alex, the self-deceived law student. She is faced with finals, and is
motivated to protect her self-image. She could accomplish this by studying diligently and
performing well, but this method risks the possibility of failure even after a good effort,
which is the worst possible outcome for her self-image. Due to some doubt regarding her
odds of success, however, the self-handicapper employs behaviors which they know are
likely to impede success, and in doing so offering themselves a self-deceptive
compromise. The desire to maintain a positive image of self may reasonably motivate the
selection of either a good-faith or self-handicapping effort. This desire, then, cannot
alone explain instances of self-handicapping behavior compared to good faith effort,
since, keeping the desire constant, we have reason to believe that self-handicapping is
adopted as a more effective means of goal pursuit.
This is not like Ike, because his motivation is only correlated with the outcome if,
by chance, Ike forgets his goal, while in cases of intentional self-deception as I
understand it, the relationship between intention and outcome is more intimately
connected. However, this alone does not render the deflationary position inadequate,
since one may claim that this same desire motivates individuals to avoid threatening
hypotheses, pursue pleasant ones.
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Upon closer inspection, though, this explanation will not suffice. What would
such a motivation look like? We may account for internal biasing in these cases via an
appeal to motivation alone, but the desire to believe that p in these cases is in fact
antithetical to the self-handicapping behavior as a means of evidence manipulation. We
can explain a case in which one fails at some task, and in turn rationalizes that failure in a
post hoc fashion, but this explanation does not account for the behavior engineers or
manipulates evidential circumstances. Internal biasing, then, does not the type of
intentional self-deception as indicated in this work, but functions as a prerequisite or
concurrent state that is necessary for S to sustain their self-deceptive project.
Self-Handicapping as Self-Deceptive Action
Recently, Marcus (2019) advances similar arguments, claiming that deflationary positions
fail account for instances of “self-deceptive action,” as “cases in which someone is not (at least
in a straightforward sense) lying, but yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action”
(p. 1205). The arguments, in short, is as follows:
“To say that S is y-ing in order to x is to portray her as already understanding herself
as engaged in the project of x-ing, and adopting the means y-ing for the reason that
it serves what she already understands to be her end. The fact that she understands
herself as x-ing is then what explains why…if she stops believing that her y-ing is
a means of x-ing—then she will stop y-ing. The realization directly bears on what
she already understands herself to be doing. She might then start z-ing in light of
her instrumental belief in the connection between z-ing and x-ing…. Even in cases
of self-deception, the agent persists in the relevant means-action only insofar as she
takes the means action to be realizing the desired end, and therefore only in virtue
of the fact that she understands herself as pursuing that end” (p. 1217).
Applied to self-handicapping then, the argument would entail that self-handicappers
realize that they are self-handicapping as a method of self-deception, and this is borne out
by the observation that such behavior answers the “how shall I question of self-deception.
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Thus, we see the two-fold nature of self-deceptive self-handicapping. Like Alex,
the self-handicapper behaves as such in order to retain a self-belief, which is one
ultimately unsupported by the evidence. But, as a practice in self-deceptive action, the
self-handicapper is deceived about their motivations in acting and the function underlying
the behavior. Self-handicapping is intentional self-deception insofar as the behaviors are
intentional actions, motivated by the goal of self-deceptive belief formation, and it this
intention in concert with the subsequent behavior which explains why it is that S falsely
believes that p. Note, I do not claim that self-handicappers intentionally deceive
themselves as a matter of the second-order deception which sustains self-handicapping.
But, this does not threaten my case; for, whether or not the self-deceptive repression of
conscious motivation is intentional, the behaviors which constitute the evidence
manipulation responsible for the inflated self-beliefs are intentional and pursuant to selfdeception. Self-deceptive self-handicapping is the result of S’s settling on self-deception
as a means of self-protection, and the behaviors function to bring the self-protective
belief about.
The Selectivity Problem
As previously mentioned, the “selectivity problem” (Bermudez, 1997; 2000) is a
problem which potentially confronts both the deflationary and Intentinoalist position. It
is often taken to be a virtue of Intentionalist accounts that these present a (ostensibly)
straightforward answer, that self-deception occurs when the desire results in an intention
to form (or to make it easier to form) the self-deceptive belief. However, as indicated in
(Jurjako, 2013; Funkhouser, 2019), Intentionalist accounts likewise are burdened with
explaining the reasons for which the intentions themselves arise in some cases and not in
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others. Just as desires alone are insufficient to produce false belief, such states are
likewise alone insufficient to explain an intention to bring about some belief.
Mele responds to the selectivity problem by arguing that, since presumably there
is a difference in the contexts in which self-deception occurs and those in which it fails,
there is no evident reason to suggest that this contextual difference may not just as well
explain the selective nature of self-deception without any further appeal to intent (2001,
p. 62). In short, Mele requests, “I would like to be told how alleged intentions to bring it
about that one believes that p are successfully executed in garden-variety cases of selfdeception” (2019, p. 9). He claims this challenge is so far unmet, and while I cannot
provide an answer which settles the matter, we may point to some potential progress. In
self-handicapping, undoubtedly situational features play a key role in determining the
formation of an intention to self-handicap. As we have seen, these factors include the
relationship between task outcome and self-image, the type and difficulty of the task at
hand, as well as the availability and salience of a potential handicap. At minimum, the
intention to self-deceive may only be carried out in those contexts in which the excuse is
available and utilizable. One may form the intention to self-deceive in various situations,
but that intention may only be realized in contexts which provide the adequate resources.
The intention arises in the first place, however, as a matter of the perceived task
context. Since self-handicapping is fundamentally self-protective, then we would predict
the self-deceptive intention to arise in situations in which self-handicapping best serves
self-protection. The Intentionalist account (or anyone else) cannot be expected to provide
a full “etiology” (Mele, 2019, p. 7) of self-deception, and I do not make any such claims
in this work. But, the contemporary movement in self-deception perhaps makes more of
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a mountain of this problem than is warranted. So, it certainly is puzzling to imagine how
and why one may form and implement an intention to self-deceive in cases in which the
intention is just to produce a self-deceptive state. But as argued in Bermudez (2001) the
intention need only be to bring about some belief, not necessarily to bring it about that S
is self-deceived, and this is the case at least in self-handicapping. In self-handicapping,
these individuals are motivated to self-protect, which may be accomplished via material
success or self-handicapping. Thus, the intention to self-deceive is formed on the basis of
situation constraints which render self-handicapping a superior means of achieving the
self-protective end. Thus, in all, the dynamic paradox is paradoxical in these instances
only if we fail to consider intentional self-deception as aimed at something other than the
self-protective end. S intentionally engages in self-deception as a means toward that
broader goal, and qua implementation intention, there is nothing incoherent about
intentional self-deception as such.
Does This Show Intention?
Now, it may be wondered, could we not still explain the behavior without an
appeal to intention, given the concession that self-deception is context-dependent in this
way? I am not sure how. As argued earlier, the avoidance of objective feedback and the
sacrifice of material success does not seem to be explainable by pure motivation, and is
seemingly antithetical to the desire that p (where p represents the relevant competency).
What deflationary accounts must maintain in these cases is that the desire that p
motivates the self-handicapper’s biased interpretation of their behavior and its outcome in
producing self-deception. But this does not explain the empirical evidence which
indicates the level of strategy employed in self-handicapping, and more importantly
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cannot explain why these individuals do not engage in a good faith effort, instead selfdeceiving in the face of potentially negative evaluations. The behavior is strong evidence
that S is settled on adopting self-deceptive means in order to self-protect, since we know
that agents may just as well explain away their failures retrospectively, but her opt for a
proactive approach. The deflationary position does not explain why S chooses selfhandicapping over some merely verbal excuse, and the fact that self-handicapping is
anticipatory in nature strongly suggests foresight about the function of that behavior.
Beginning to wrap up, a particular empirical study that is unrelated to selfhandicapping but intimately related to self-deceptive action is (Quattrone and Tversky,
1985), which showed that individuals will self-deceive about their intentions in acting if
doing so provides some benefit. Specifically, these participants apparently self-deceived
about their level of effort in keeping their arm submerged in ice water when led to believe
that such cold tolerance was an indicator of heart health. However, while these
individuals did submit themselves to the conditions for longer, they did not report an
increased effort to do so. The explanation offered is that these individuals were
motivated to increase their efforts in keeping their arm submerged without admitting to
themselves their reasons for doing so. If aware that they intended to submerge their arms
for as long as possible, there is no reason to believe the experiment evidences an actual
increased tolerance, and likewise provides no evidence of heart health.
Mele claims that there is no need to posit intention here, since it may simply be
the case that when presented with evidence of heart health, the motivation for this to be
true biases understanding of their own efforts. Perhaps these individuals “hope” that they
will find evidence of a healthy heart, and this desire in turn biases their interpretation of
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the available evidence (2019, p. 13). This is all likely correct, and may well explain the
internal self-deception as the suppressed awareness of one’s motivations and intentions.
But it also overlooks the intentional self-deception as evidenced in external evidence
manipulation. That being, these participants, like self-handicappers, settle on engaging in
an effort in order to bring about favorable evidence, and this settling is the relevant
intention. To use some admittedly loaded language, a lay explanation of the behaviors
might describe the individuals as “deciding” to engage in the activities which make it
easier to believe that p, and as such, form an intention to self-deceive and attempt to see
that intention through. Though I provide no thorough explanation of how it is that
individuals self-deceive about the content of their subjective reasons for acting by way of
internal biasing, this does not alter our observation that in anticipating some outcome,
individuals apparently form an intention to make it easier to acquire or retain a welcomed
self-belief, and further that individuals are often successful in bringing those beliefs
about.
This is the fundamental benefit of framing self-deceptive self-handicapping
within self-deceptive action. As Marcus (2019) points out, what the deflationary position
cannot evidently explain is the action guiding nature of the behavior without an appeal to
intention, but what I hoped to have done here is supplement this argument, showing a
case in which this action itself generates self-deceptive beliefs. The behavior is
intentional in the banal sense of non-coerced, but is an instance of intentional selfdeception on grounds that self-deception sparks, sustains, and satisfies the practical
reasoning manifest by the intention.
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Lastly, along such lines, the behavior may be explained as an instance of “robust,
unconscious self-deception” (Funkhouser & Barrett, 2016), which is strategic and
nuanced, but does not posit the presence of an intention in self-deception. That work,
however, does not outright deny the possible function of intention, but rather wants to
“side-step” the issue (p. 683). But, in all, it is unclear what evidence of intention might
satisfy the staunch Motivationalist beyond this kind of strategic manipulation. Mele does
not deny the possibility of unconscious intent, and describes intention as an executive
attitude of S’s being settled on a course of action, where this intention guides and sustains
that course. In all, this sounds very much like the case of self-deceptive selfhandicapping. The self-handicapper is disposed to self-protect, and adopts an
unconscious attitude of being settled on self-deception as a means toward that end. Thus,
in these cases, S forms the intent to self-deceive in light of the broader goal of selfprotection, and self-handicapping operates as a means of carrying out the self-deceptive
venture. If successful, self-handicapping ultimately terminates in the acquisition or
retention of a valued, self-deceptive self-belief.
Conclusion
I have offered a prima facie case that self-handicapping behavior may constitute
an instance of self-deception, and moreover, is best explained by Intentionalism. As
argued, self-handicapping is motivated by, and results in, the same states as selfdeception; specifically, a desire to believe some proposition. Furthermore, I have argued
that the nature of self-handicapping as anticipatory, and as a self-deceptive action,
renders the best explanation one which appeals to intention. Motivationalist accounts
cannot readily explain the selection of self-handicapping over a good faith effort in
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situations which share a self-protective goal without an appeal to the intention to selfdeceived. Admittedly, this does not bar a more sophisticated Motivationalist reading
from explaining the phenomenon, but as a new investigation in the field of selfdeception, no such literature exists. For now, it appears Intentionalism is best suited to
account for the behaviors and beliefs of the self-deceptive self-handicapper.
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